We consider extensions of the language of Peano arithmetic by transfinitely iterated truth definitions satisfying uniform Tarskian biconditionals. Without further axioms, such theories are known to be conservative extensions of the original system of arithmetic. Much stronger systems, however, are obtained by adding either induction axioms or reflection axioms on top of them. Theories of this kind can interpret some well-known predicatively reducible fragments of secondorder arithmetic such as iterated arithmetical comprehension.
Introduction
This paper continues the line of research that started with [3] . The main idea of this approach is to study questions of proof-theoretic analysis of theories from the point of view of provability logic methods. Using such methods leads one to consider algebraic structures that occupy, in a sense, an intermediate position between the highly complex world of formal theories (such as systems of first-or second-order arithmetic and set theory) and the simpler and constructive world of natural ordinal notation systems.
This approach has previously been applied to Peano arithmetic, its fragments and modest extensions. In this paper we make the next necessary step and consider from this point of view theories of predicative strength. Theories of this kind emerged in the works of Solomon Feferman and Kurt Schütte in the 1960s who explicated the informal notion of predicative proof in terms of certain systems of ramified analysis and isolated the proof-theoretic ordinal Γ 0 as a bound to transfinite induction provable in such systems [18, 42] . Since that time, systems reducible to predicative ones in the sense of Feferman and Schütte have been studied quite extensively.
Even though the emphasis in the work in proof theory later shifted to much stronger impredicative theories, theories of predicative strength and bounds thereof remain an important landmark. Thus, a system ATR 0 of proof-theoretic strength exactly Γ 0 was isolated by Harvey Friedman in pursuing the reverse mathematics program. Modulo a weak second order theory, that system turned out to be equivalent to some well-known theorems of ordinary mathematics.
Feferman with his collaborators returned to the analysis of predicativity several times during his long career, formulating ever more convincing and simpler to state predicative systems (see e.g. [19, 20] ). More recently, Nick Weaver [46] disputed the fact that systems presented by Feferman and Schütte adequately represent the informal notion of predicativity. We are sympathetic with the doubts of this kind. However, we also believe that the class of systems isolated by Feferman and Schütte is important in its own right irrespectively of the association of one or another informal notion of predicative proof with it. Henceforth, we will be using the term predicative in the sense of Feferman-Schütte.
The goal of this paper is to provide an alternative approach to prooftheoretic analysis of the class of theories of proof-theoretic strength below Γ 0 . The main feature of this analysis is the use of hierarchies of reflection principles and conservation results between them instead of the use of infinitary calculi. Under this approach, the ordinal notation systems emerge in the guise of weak propositional (strictly positive) logics, i.e., fragments of provability logic representing the algebras of reflection principles. The close relation between the objects representing the ordinals and the objects representing the theories makes for us the reductions from one to the other rather simple.
Provalibility logics with transfinitely many modalities, such as GLP Λ and their strictly positive counterparts RC Λ , have been studied already for some time, most notably in the series of works by Joost Joosten and David Fernández-Duque, see [5, 14, 13, 22, 1, 26] . However, our study seems to be the first one where this machinery is developed enough to yield prooftheoretic analysis results for theories significantly stronger than Peano arithmetic. The main novelty of this paper from a technical point of view are basic conservation theorems (Theorems 1 and 2) generalizing the so-called reduction property in arithmetic. The machinery of reflection algebras is then used to generalize these results to transfinitely iterated reflection principles and higher levels of logical complexity.
Another advantage of our approach is that it allows one to obtain the main results associated with proof-theoretic analysis of theories -such as consistency proofs, determination of the classes of provably total computable functions, characterization of provable well-orderings -all at once. This is based on a general formula relating hierarchies of reflection principles of different strength. Formulas of this kind appeared in the work of Ulf Schmerl, first for arithmetic [40] and then for the ramified analysis [41] . In this paper we are, in a sense, redoing the work of Schmerl, but in a different way and, to simplify matters, for a different class of systems (which are first order rather than ramified second order).
The reflection principles for theories of truth already have been investigated (see [12, Chapter XII] ). Graham Leigh [33] have studied reflection principles over theories of iterated truth predicates. He characterizes arithmetical consequences of such theories in terms of transfinite induction using the tools of infinitary proof theory. Our basic theory of uniform Tarski biconditionals is rather similar to the one of [33] , however we consider finer hierarchies of reflection principles and use different methods.
Our treatment is essentially self-contained and includes sometimes careful proofs of results that are more or less well-known. The only prooftheoretic tool that we are using is the standard cut-elimination for predicate logic in the form of Tait calculus. We also rely on the method of arithmetization along with the construction of truth definitions.
The basic systems for which we state our results are formulated in the first-order language of Peano arithmetic expanded by a series of new unary predicate letters representing iterated truth definitions. These predicates are postulated to satisfy rather weak axioms for truth -the so-called uniform Tarski biconditionals. 1 The use of weak axioms for truth and delegating the main power of the system to reflection principles added on top of them is one of the key technical ideas of this paper. It is interesting to remark that in this way we can recover some of the results about the compositional 1 From the point of view of the theory of truth it is more interesting and common to consider stronger axioms for truth predicates, e.g., the compositional axioms CT. Theories based on compositional axioms for truth can also be considered in our context, and in fact they were considered by Lev Beklemishev and Evgeny Dashkov at an earlier stage of this project. However, this choice leads to undesirable complications, both on the level of proof theory and on the level of modal logic, which we prefer to avoid. truth axioms, e.g., a theorem due to Henryk Kotlarski on the strength of ∆ 0 (T)-induction schema over CT [30] . The plan of this paper is as follows. In Sections 3 and 4 we prove two key conservation results for the theory of uniform Tarski biconditionals extended by restricted uniform reflection principles. The first of these results gives a conservation of Π 1 (T)-reflection principle over the arithmetical uniform reflection principle, for all arithmetical sentences. The second result, for each n > 0, is a conservation of Π n+1 (T)-reflection principle over ω-times iterated Π n (T)-reflection principle for Π n (T)-sentences. In Section 5 we introduce theories of iterated truth predicates and the corresponding reflection principles. We reinterpret the results of Sections 3 and 4 for these theories as two different reduction formulas. Section 6 considers a strictly positive logic with transfinitely many modalities, RC Λ , which is a straightforward generalization of the reflection calculus RC. We recapitulate the results of [5] calculating the order types of the ordering of RC Λ formulas. In Section 7 we capitalize on the previous work and obtain Schmerl-type conservation results for iterated truth theories by using RC Λ . In Section 8 we outline the ideas of ordinal analysis of iterated reflection and the use of reflection algebras for this purpose. In Section 9 we apply these results to obtain conservation theorems and ordinal analysis of some standard systems of second-order arithmetic of predicative strength.
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Preliminaries: languages and truth theories
As our basic system of arithmetic we take Elementary Arithmetic EA, also known as EFA or I∆ 0 (exp), in any of its standard formulations (see [24, 4] ). The language of EA has symbols for successor, addition, multiplication, exponentiation functions and the order relation. The axioms of EA comprise basic defining equations for all these symbols, as well as the induction axioms for bounded (∆ 0 (exp)) formulas. EA + denotes the extension of EA by an axiom asserting the totality of superexponentiation function, also known as I∆ 0 + Supexp (see [24] ).
Let L be a first order language extending that of EA with at most countably many fresh predicate symbols. We assume fixed an elementary Gödel numbering of L.
Let ∆ L 0 denote the class of formulas obtained from atomic L-formulas and formulas of the form T(t), where t is a term, by Boolean connectives and bounded quantifiers. The classes Π L n and Σ L n are defined from ∆ L 0 in the usual way:
We consider an L(T)-theory UTB L axiomatized by the following schemata:
U2: ¬T(n), for all n such that n is not a Gödel number of an L-sentence.
Here, ϕ( x) is an elementarily definable term representing the function mapping n 1 , . . . , n k to the Gödel number of ϕ(n 1 , . . . , n k ), provided x = x 1 , . . . , x k .
The theory UTB L plays a central role in this paper. We remark that it can be given a natural Π L 2 -axiomatization by taking U2 together with the following schemata, for all L-formulas ϕ, ψ:
If Axioms C2-C4 are stated as 'global' axioms with a universal quantifier over Gödel numbers of L-formulas ϕ, ψ, the corresponding theory is known as Tarski compositional axioms for truth and is denoted CT L in this paper. 2 The following lemma is well-known and straightforward, it is verifiable in EA by building a local interpretation. Let S be any L-theory containing EA.
By a Gödelian theory we mean a theory, in a language as above, whose set of axioms comes equipped with an elementary (∆ 0 (exp)) formula defining its set of Gödel numbers in the standard model of arithmetic. With every such theory S we associate its Σ 1 provability predicate ✷ S (x) in a standard way [17] . We say that S 1 U -provably contains S 2 if
Suppose S is Gödelian and Γ is a set of formulas in the language of S. By Γ-RFN(S) we denote the uniform reflection principle for Γ-formulas, that is, the schema
In particular, L-RFN(S) is the uniform reflection principle for all L-formulas.
T-RFN(S)
is the following T-reflection principle:
We note two obvious lemmas.
Proof. Concerning the proof of (v), we remark that provably in EA, for all L-formulas ϕ, ψ, conditions C2-C4 are provable in S (since S contains UTB). Since C2-C4 are at most Π L 2 , we infer CT L by applying reflection for S. ✷ Let L be a language with or without T.
2 It is denoted CT − L in some treatments to stress the absence of induction axioms. We do not presuppose any induction axioms in CTL.
(
Next we recall that reflection implies induction, as noted by Kreisel and Lévy [32] .
Lemma 2.4
If S is an L-theory provably containing EA, then
Proof. (i) The usual argument goes, for any ∆ L 0 -formula ϕ, as follows. First, show that
Then, using ∆ L 0 -RFN(S) we infer
which implies the standard instance of the induction axiom for ϕ. The proof of Claims (ii) and (iii) is similar. ✷ Remark 2.5 For the language of arithmetic, by a well-known result of D. Leivant [34] , the theory IΠ n is equivalent to EA + Π n+2 -RFN(EA) for each n 1. This implies the earlier result by Kreisel and Lévy that EA + RFN(EA) ≡ PA.
However, for the language with a truth predicate, full reflection over EA+UTB L is stronger than full induction. One can prove by a simple modeltheoretic argument that the theory EA+ UTB L + IL(T) is a conservative extension of PA. On the other hand, the theory EA + L(T)-RFN(EA + UTB L ) is not: By Lemma 2.2 (v) it proves the compositional axioms CT L , which already with the weaker T-reflection imply arithmetical reflection over PA (see Kotlarsky [30] ).
Conservativity of Π 1 (T)-reflection
Theorem 1 Suppose S is a theory in a language extending L(T) and prov-
Proof. For each finite fragment F of the signature of L and a finite set Γ ⊆ UTB F we will construct a non-relativizing and F-preserving interpretation of the theory EA+ Γ + ∆ F 0 (T)-RFN(S) in EA+ F-RFN(S). By Lemma 2.3(i) this yields a suitable local interpretation of EA + UTB L + Π L 1 (T)-RFN(S) which implies L-conservativity by compactness.
Axioms of Γ are either of the form ¬T(n) or of the form
for some ψ ∈ F. Fix an m < ω such that, for each axiom of Γ and the corresponding formula ψ, both ψ and ¬ψ are in Π F m . It is well-known that there is a truth definition Tr Π F m in EA F for Π F m -formulas (see Theorem 13 in the Appendix, where a somewhat sharper result needed later is spelled out). In the following proof we read R m (S) as Π F m+1 -RFN(S). By Lemma 2.4, EA + R 0 (S) contains EA F . In Lemma 3.2 we construct an F-formula θ(x) that will serve as the interpretation of T(x). Here and below∧,¬,˙ stand for elementary terms defining syntactical operations on the Gödel numbers of formulas, as in Feferman [17] .
Lemma 3.2
There is a Π F m+2 -formula θ(x) such that the following properties hold provably in EA + F-RFN(S):
(θ commutes with propositional connectives);
Before proving this lemma, let us show that these properties are sufficient to prove the translations of all the axioms of Γ + ∆ F 0 (T)-RFN(S) in EA + F-RFN(S). 3 If an axiom of Γ has the form ¬T(n), where n is not the G.n. of an L-sentence, then ¬θ(n) is provable by T0. The other axioms of Γ translate into ψ( x) ↔ θ( ψ( x) ). Note that the implication ψ( x) → θ( ψ( x) ) follows from T3. Applying T3 to ¬ψ( x) we obtain θ( ¬ψ( x) ) which yields ¬θ( ψ( x) ) by T2.
To deal with bounded quantifiers we need a definition and two lemmas. For each ∆ F 0 (T)-formula ϕ( x) we specify an elementarily definable term ϕ * ( x) as follows:
is an atomic F-formula; 3 With some care, one can check that T0-T3 can, in fact, be verified in EA + Rm+3(S).
T(t(
For each n, ϕ * ( n) denotes the Gödel number of a sentence which is equivalent to ϕ( n) in UTB F . Formalizing this fact in EA yields
Proof. Induction on the build-up of ϕ. If ϕ ∈ F and atomic, the claim is trivial. If ϕ has the form T(t( x)) for some term t, we reason in EA as follows. Given x, if t( x) is the G.n. of an F-sentence ψ, then ✷ S (T(ψ) ↔ ψ) by Lemma 2.2, and the claim follows. If t( x) = n is not a G.n. of an Fsentence, then ϕ * ( x) = t ′ ( x) = 0 = 1 . By the axioms U2 and the equality axioms, the sentence T(t( x)) is equivalent to T(n) and refutable in S. Hence, it is equivalent to 0 = 1 and to ϕ * ( x). Boolean connectives preserve the equivalence. For the bounded quantifier, we use the fact that EA ⊢ ∀ϕ∀n ✷ S ( ∀x n ϕ(x) ↔˙ x n ϕ(x) ).
✷
Let ϕ θ denote the translation of a formula ϕ ∈ F(T) under the substitution T(t)/θ(t).
Proof. We argue by induction on the build-up of ϕ. All cases except for the case of a bounded quantifier are easy. Let ϕ = ∀x t ψ(x). Then ϕ θ is equivalent to ∀x t θ(ψ * (x)) by the induction hypothesis. We claim that
The implication from left to right is proved by induction on y using T2. By Lemma 2.4 the induction is available in EA + F-RFN(S). The implication from right to left is easier and can be inferred from T1 and T2 without the use of induction. From this claim we conclude that ∀x t θ(ψ * (x)) is equivalent to θ(˙ i t ψ * (i)) which is the same as θ(ϕ * ). This concludes the proof of lemma. ✷ Proof. Let ϕ(x) be a ∆ F 0 (T)-formula. Reasoning in EA+F-RFN(S) assume ✷ S ϕ(x). Then ✷ S ϕ * (x), by Lemma 3.3. By T1, we infer θ(ϕ * (x)), which implies ϕ(x) θ by Lemma 3.4. ✷ Now we prove Lemma 3.2. The formula θ(x) is constructed via the standard (arithmetized) process of completion of S, but with m-consistency instead of the usual consistency (cf. [17, Theorem 4.11] ). We note that this construction is simpler than (and, in fact, a part of) the equally well-known construction of a Henkin-completion of S. Namely, let ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , . . . be an enumeration of all F-sentences, set T 0 = ∅ and define
Next we will give the formula θ(x) such that θ(ϕ x ) expresses the fact that
Let x ∈ A z express in EA that the x-th bit in the binary expansion of z is 1. Formally we put θ(x) to be ∃y (x = ϕ y ∧ θ ′ (y)), where
Now let us check that the theory EA + F-RFN(S) proves the conditions T0-T3 for θ(x). The condition T0 trivially follows from the definition of θ(x). Recall that by Lemma 2.4 the theory F-RFN(S) contains full scheme of F-induction. Reasoning in EA + F-RFN(S) we prove by induction on n that R m (S + T n ) (which is just a formalized version of the assertion S + all true Π F m -sentences + T n is consistent). Using this it is easy to derive that S ⊆ T ω , which yields T1. Similarly, T ω contains all true Π F m sentences, which gives us T3. Further, for each ϕ exactly one of the following two possibilities holds 1. ϕ ∈ T ω or 2. ¬ϕ ∈ T ω ; this gives us the part of T2 about negation. Finally, we prove that T ω is closed under first-order deduction, which in particular implies the part of T2 about conjunction.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2 and of Theorem 1. ✷
The result now follows by applying the previous theorem to the theory S + UTB L . ✷
Conservativity of Π n+1 (T)-reflection
The main result of this section is a relativization of the reduction property for arithmetical reflection principles, that is, of Theorem 2 in [2] . In the present setup the usual argument in arithmetic goes through without any substantial changes. However, we need to take care of some extra details. The most important detail is the need for the reflection schemata to be finitely axiomatizable, for the easy (inclusion) part of the theorem. This part is based on the existence of partial truth definitions and the finiteness of the language and requires ∆ L 0 (T)-induction, whereas the conservation part does not.
In this section L can be a language with or without T. Let S be a Gödelian theory in a language extending L and provably containing EA. We abbreviate by R S,n (ϕ) the schema Π L n+1 -RFN(S + ϕ). We also write R S,n for R S,n (⊤). If L is finite, R S,n will be finitely axiomatizable. However, in general, R S,n (ϕ) is an elementarily axiomatized (possibly infinite) schema. We read R 1 ⊢ R 2 as: each instance ϕ 2 ∈ R 2 is provable in EA + R 1 ;
Lemma 4.1 For all n 0, the following properties hold provably in EA:
Proof. For each item we give an informal argument that can be readily formalized in EA.
Hence, using R S,n (ϕ) we obtain θ(m) by reflection.
We observe that θ 1 ∨ θ 2 is logically equivalent to
Reasoning in EA + R S,n (ϕ ∨ ψ) we now prove formula (1). Consider any x, y and assume
Remark 4.2 Notice that UTB L is axiomatized over EA by Π L 2 (T)-sentences, hence the result applies to L(T)-theories U containing UTB L . Also notice that the conclusion R S,n (ϕ) of the rule is, generally, a schema rather than a sentence, which means that one is allowed to infer from ϕ any instance of that schema.
Proof. As in the arithmetical case the proof goes by considering a cut-free derivation in Tait calculus of the sequent
where Π is a set of Π L n+1 -formulas, ¬U is a finite set of the negations of the axioms of U , and Σ is a finite set of the negations of the Σ L n+1 -RFN(S) schema instances. Every such instance has the form
. Let P ϕ (x, y) denote the formula in square brackets. We can also assume the axioms of U to have the form ∀x 1 . . .
. By the subformula property, any formula occurring in a derivation of a sequent Γ of the form (2) either (a) is a Π L n+1 -formula, or (b) has the form Σ, ∃xP ϕ (t, x) or P ϕ (t, s), for some terms s, t, or (c) has the form
for some i < m and terms t 1 , . . . , t i . Let Γ − denote the result of deleting all formulas of types (b) and (c) from Γ. Let U ′ denote the closure of U under the rule ϕ/R S,n (ϕ) with ϕ ∈ Π L n+1 .
Proof. Induction on the height d of a derivation of Γ. It is sufficient to consider the case that a formula of type (b) or (c) is introduced by the last application of a rule in d; besides, it is sufficient to only consider the formulas P ϕ (t, s) and ∃x m A(t 1 , . . . , t m−1 , x m ), because in all the other cases the premise and the conclusion of the rule coincide, after applying the operation (·) − . The second case is easy (see [2] ). Thus, let us assume that a derivation d has the form
where ϕ ∈ Π L n+1 and ¬ϕ(s) denotes the result of substituting the term s into the term ¬ϕ(x) . Then, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain some derivations in U ′ of the formulas
Since ∆ − consists of Π L n+1 -formulas, the reflection rule is applicable to (4) and we obtain a U ′ -proof of
Using Lemma 4.1 we derive:
On the other hand, replacing t by an existential quantifier from (3) we obtain
Together with 4. by the rule of cut this yields a U ′ -proof of ∆ − . This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.3 and thereby of Theorem 2. ✷ Now we show that under certain conditions one can characterize the closure of U under the rule ϕ/R S,n (ϕ) for ϕ ∈ Π L n+1 by ω-iterated reflection principles.
Let a signature L now be finite. We begin by stating the well-known fact that the schema I∆ L 0 is finitely axiomatizable over EA. This is a corollary of the following proposition (see Lemma 4.2 in [16] for a short proof) that we state for a single unary predicate P . Recall that x ∈ A z means that the x-th bit in the binary expansion of z is 1.
Proposition 4.4
The following are equivalent over EA:
The following theorem is crucial for several results in this paper.
1 denote the formula axiomatizing I∆ L 0 over EA. We know that the schema R S,n implies π. We claim that R S,n is equivalent over EA to a conjunction of π and the formula
where Tr m is the truth definition for Π L m -formulas constructed in Appendix A. Clearly, (5) implies R S,n in EA + π: For each ϕ ∈ Π L n+1 we can infer from ✷ S ϕ(x) the formula Tr n+1 (ϕ(x)) by (5) and then ϕ(x) using π.
For the opposite implication we first remark that I∆ L 0 and π are provable from Π L n+1 -RFN(S) by Lemma 2.4. In order to prove (5) we consider two cases: n = 0 and n > 0. For n = 0 we use Theorem 13 (ii) saying that, for
This fact is formalizable in EA. Then, since S provably contains EA, ✷ S ϕ implies ✷ S Tr 1 (ϕ) and hence Tr 1 (ϕ) by reflection.
If n > 0 then we reason in EA as follows. If ϕ ∈ Π L n+1 and ✷ S ϕ then ✷ S (π → ϕ). Since π provably entails I∆ L 0 over S, and by Theorem 13 (i)
. By an application of Π L 1 -reflection we prove π and thus we can infer Tr n+1 (ϕ). ✷
We can then define R ω S,n as the (infinite) schema {R k S,n : k < ω}.
Lemma 4.6 Suppose S provably contains U and n 1. The following theories are equivalent:
Proof. Since the schemata R S,n (ψ) are finitely axiomatizable, by external induction on k we can derive R k S,n using k applications of the rule. Hence, theory (i) contains (ii).
The theory U + {R k S,n : k < ω} is closed under the rule:
.✷ We now combine Theorem 2 and Lemma 4.6 into the following theorem that will be used below.
n+2 -axiomatizable extension of EA and S provably contains U , then U + R S,n+1 is a Π L n+1 -conservative extension of the theory U + {R k S,n : k < ω}.
Remark 4.7 The proofs of Theorems 2 and 4 are formalizable in EA + , which leads to EA + -provable conservativity of the respective pairs of theories. The essential ingredient that required the use of superexponentiation axiom was the application of the cut-elimination theorem for first order logic. Well-known superexponential lower bounds on the speed-up of proofs of Π 2 -statements of IΣ 1 w.r.t. PRA show that the use of superexponentiation axiom here is really necessary [38, 27] .
As another corollary we obtain a new proof of a theorem due to Henryk Kotlarski [30] characterizing arithmetical consequences of global reflection. In a recent paper, M. Le lyk [35] proved that ∆ 0 (T)-induction is equivalent to the global reflection principle T-RFN(EA) over the extension of EA by the full compositional axioms for truth. (This result was also claimed by Kotlarski, but later a gap was found in his proof of reflection by induction.) A somewhat more general result is as follows. Proof. Let UTB denote UTB L where L is the language of EA, and let S be U + UTB. Clearly, S is provably conservative over U . Note that UTB + Σ 1 (T)-RFN(S) contains S and is sufficient to derive all compositional axioms as well as I∆ 0 (T), whence
where the latter conservation holds by Theorem 4 for the language L(T). Then one shows that the theory UTB + R n S,1 is conservative over EA + RFN n (U ) for arithmetical sentences by induction on n using Corollary 3.6 (formalized in EA). We obtain that UTB + R ω S,1 is conservative over EA + RFN ω (U ), whence the result follows. ✷ Open question. By the results of Kotlarski and Le lyk the theory EA + CT + I∆ 0 (T) is equivalent to
Is this theory equivalent to EA + UTB + Σ 1 (T)-RFN(EA + UTB)?
Theories of iterated truth and reflection
Consider the language L α := L ∪ {T β | β < α}, where L is the arithmetic language (or its extension by finitely many predicate symbols). We assume fixed an elementary well-ordering representing ordinals up to α. This ordering determines a natural Gödel numbering of all objects of L α . We interpret T β as the truth definition for the language L β (note that L 0 is the language of arithmetic). For each α we define an L α+1 -theory UTB α as UTB Lα . Also define
Even though the language of EA + UTB α is, in general, infinite, this theory can be considered as a definitional extension of a theory EA+UTB * α formulated in the language L(T α ) with a single truth predicate. Indeed, for each formula ϕ ∈ L α+1 let ϕ * denote the result of substitution
α be axiomatized by {ϕ * : ϕ ∈ UTB α }. Then, the following lemma is easy to verify.
The following lemma is easy to prove by a model-theoretic argument, however we need a proof formalizable in EA. Such a proof is only slightly longer and based on a standard idea.
Lemma 5.2 EA + UTB <α conservatively extends EA + UTB <β for β < α.
Proof. It is sufficient to construct a non-relativizing interpretation of any finite subtheory of UTB <α in UTB <β . Consider such a fragment U . Let α 1 < α 2 < · · · < α n be all the indices of truth predicates occurring in U with α i β. It is easy to translate
Here ϕ j ( y), for j < k i , are all the formulas for which the Tarski biconditionals for T α i occur in U . Clearly, the translations of all these biconditionals are provable just from the axioms of EA (in the extended language). Let us denote this interpretation K i . Now one can argue by induction on i and prove that the part of U in the language L β (T α 1 , . . . , T α i−1 ) is interpretable in EA + UTB <β . This is clear for i = 0. Assuming that K is such an interpretation for i, consider the composition of K i and K. ✷ Let us now fix an elementary well-ordering (Λ, <) and let UTB := UTB <Λ . This ordinal notation system can be extended to a slightly larger segment of ordinals up to ω(1 + Λ), e.g., by encoding ordinals ωα + n as pairs α, n . We introduce the following classes of formulas corresponding to the levels of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy up to ω(1 + Λ): 4
• Π <λ := α<λ Π α for limit λ.
Even though the classes Π α are formulated, generally speaking, in an infinite language, we can often restrict the language to a single truth predicate. From Lemma 5.1 we obtain
We define the reflection operators, for all α, λ < ω(1 + Λ), λ ∈ Lim, as follows:
Note that for n < ω we obtain the usual arithmetical reflection principles R n (S) ≡ RFN Π n+1 (S). Further, by Lemma 5.3 we have
4 According to this definition Π1+α corresponds to Π1(0 (α) )-sets. Many of the formulas below would be simpler if Πn would denote Π1+n, but we chose to stick to the standard notation.
(ii) If S provably contains EA + UTB α and
is finitely axiomatizable over EA + UTB α ;
(iii) If S provably contains EA + UTB <α , then over EA + UTB <α
We only remark that Statement (ii) follows from (i) and Theorem 3. By ≡ α and ≡ <λ we denote conservativity for Π 1+α -sentences and Π <λ -sentences, respectively. The following conservation results obtained from Theorems 1 and 4 hold provably in EA + and together play the main technical role in our treatment.
We remark that the same theorem works over any extension of UTB by Π <λ -sentences.
is an L-conservative extension of U + R α+1 (S). Hence, the result follows from Theorem 4 for L, which amounts to the usual reduction property in arithmetic [2, Theorem 2] .
Suppose α = ω(1 + β) + n, for some β and n, then V + R α+1 (S) is a conservative extension of U + UTB β + R α+1 (S). Theorem 4 does not directly apply in this situation, since the language of UTB β might be infinite. However, by Lemma 5.1, UTB β is a conservative extension of a theory
Since U ′ is contained in UTB, we obtain the result. ✷
Reflection calculus
We refer the reader to a note [8] for a short introduction to strictly positive logic sufficient for the present paper and to [29] for more information from a general algebraic perspective. For background on modal logic and provability logic we refer to the books [11, 43, 10] .
The system RC Λ
Fix an ordinal (notation system) (Λ, <). Consider a modal language with propositional variables p, q,. . . , a constant ⊤ and connectives ∧ and α, for each ordinal α < Λ (understood as diamond modalities). Strictly positive formulas (or simply formulas) are built up by the grammar: 5. αA ⊢ βA for α > β;
The system RC ω is the familiar system RC introduced in an equational logic format by Dashkov [15] , the present formulation is from [6] . 5 Dashkov showed that RC axiomatizes the set of all sequents A ⊢ B such that the implication A → B is provable in Japaridze's polymodal provability logic GLP. Moreover, unlike GLP itself, RC is polytime decidable and enjoys the finite frame property (whereas GLP is Kripke incomplete) [15] .
The system RC Λ is a straightforward generalization of RC to transfinitely many modalities. It relates to a version of GLP with transfinitely many modalities GLP Λ in the same way as RC relates to GLP. The system GLP Λ was introduced in [5] and further studied in several papers by Joost Joosten and David Fernández-Duque (see [14, 22] ).
If L is a strictly positive logic, we write A ⊢ L B for the statement that the sequent A ⊢ B is provable in L, and A = L B stands for A ⊢ L B and B ⊢ L A. When context allows we will often omit the subscript.
Notice that RC Λ proves the following polytransitivity principles: if α β then αβA ⊢ ββA ⊢ βA and βαA ⊢ ββA ⊢ βA. Also, the converse of Axiom 6 is provable in RC Λ , so that in fact we have
We also mention the following properties:
• If ω Λ < Ω then RC Ω conservatively extends RC Λ .
• Derivability problem in RC Λ is polytime reducible to the problem of comparison of ordinal notations in (Λ, <).
The first claim can be proved by an easy syntactic argument, see also [1] where it is done for GLP Λ . The second claim is based on the result of Dashkov [15] on the polytime decidability of RC. Since we are working in this paper with elementary well-orderings Λ, we can therefore assume that RC Λ is elementary decidable.
6.2 Variable-free fragment of RC Λ Let RC 0 Λ denote the fragment of RC Λ without propositional variables. Formulas of RC 0 Λ will serve for us as canonical ordinal notations. This has been studied quite carefully, so we only briefly recall some basic facts all of which can be found in [5] .
Let F Λ denote the set of all variable-free RC Λ -formulas, and let F Λ α denote its restriction to the signature {β : α β < Λ}, so that
Obviously, < Λ α is a transitive relation invariantly defined on the equivalence classes w.r.t. provable equivalence in RC Λ . Since RC Λ is elementarily decidable, so are both = RC Λ and all of < Λ α . Since RC Ω conservatively extends RC Λ for ω Λ < Ω, the structure (F Λ , < Λ α ) is isomorphic to an initial substructure of (F Ω , < Ω α ). Therefore, it will be convenient for us in this section to fix a maximal possible Λ, that is, to think about Λ as the class of all ordinals. 6 Notationally we will not carry the subscript Λ any longer and will refer to RC Λ and RC 0 Λ simply as RC and RC 0 , respectively. An RC-formula without variables and ∧ is called a word (or a worm in some treatments). In fact, any such formula syntactically is a finite sequence of letters α (followed by ⊤). If A, B are words then AB will denote A[⊤/B], that is, the word corresponding to the concatenation of these sequences. A ⊜ B denotes the graphical identity of formulas (words).
The set of all words will be denoted W, and W α will denote its restriction to the signature {β : β α}. The following facts are from [5] :
• Every A ∈ F α is RC-equivalent to a word in W α ;
• (W α /= RC , < α ) is well-ordered. In fact, all these structures are order isomorphic to the class of all ordinals.
In order to compute the order types of words we recall the standard Veblen hierarchy (see [37] ). Given a class X ⊆ On let en X denote its enumerating function. Let X ′ denote the class of fixed points of en X , that is, X ′ = {α ∈ On : en X (α) = α}. Define by transfinite induction on α the so-called critical classes:
Cr
It is easy to verify that for all α the classes Cr α are closed and unbounded, and that the functions ϕ α are increasing and continuous. The least ordinal α such that α ∈ Cr α is the Feferman-Schütte ordinal Γ 0 . It can also be characterized as the limit of the sequence ϕ 0 (0), ϕ ϕ 0 (0) (0), . . . , in other words, as the first ordinal closed under the operation α → ϕ α (0).
Let o(A) denote the order type of the word A in (W/= RC , < 0 ). If X is a class of words, we denote o(X) := {o(A) : A ∈ X}. We also denote by α ↑ A the result of replacing each letter β of A by α + β and A + := (1 ↑ A).
The following statements allow one to compute o(A) in terms of the Veblen ϕ function [5] .
This formula is based on item 2.
We note that Joosten and Fernández-Duque gave a different and nice way to relate ordinal notations to a family of ordinal functions and the Veblen hierarchy [22] . Their formulas based on hyperexponential functions can be used here instead of 1-3. A general advantage of the kind of prooftheoretic analysis that we are doing is that it is modular: we treat words as ordinal notations themselves, we know that the ordering we use is wellfounded and naturally computable. So, the treatment of Veblen functions only serves the purpose of relating these notations to other more familiar systems and for our self-control. The reader can use instead the functions and the treatment of notations by Fernández-Duque and Joosten.
Reflection algebras
Fix an ordinal notation system (Λ, <) and the corresponding language L Λ as in Section 5. We interpret reflection calculus RC Λ in the semilattice G S of Gödelian extensions of S where S provably contains EA + UTB. In doing that we technically follow the treatments in [7, 9] where the reader can look for additional details.
Fix some base theory S, which we suppose to be closed under the Σ 1 -collection rule. We write S 1 S S 2 iff S 1 S-provably extends S 2 , that is,
We write S 1 = S S 2 iff S 1 S S 2 and S 2 S S 1 . The set of all Gödelian theories provably extending S modulo = S is a lattice G S where the meet S 1 ∧ S S 2 corresponds to the (naturally defined) union of theories. Reflection principles R α defined in Section 5 induce, for each α, monotone and semiidempotent operators acting on G S , provided S contains EA + UTB.
Definition 1 Reflection algebra of S is the structure of semilattice with operators (G S ; ∧ S , ⊤ S , (R α ) α<Λ ).
Reflection algebras yield a natural interpretation of the language of RC Λ : RC Λ -formulas are sent to (equivalence classes of) Gödelian theories in G S in such a way that ⊤ corresponds to ⊤ S , ∧ corresponds to the union of theories ∧ S , and α corresponds to R α , for each α < Λ.
An arithmetical interpretation in G S is a map * from RC Λ -formulas to G S satisfying the following conditions:
• (αA) * = R α (A * ), for all α < Λ.
Using Lemma 4.1 we verify the following basic theorem.
Theorem 7 For all formulas
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the length of a derivation in RC Λ . We only check the nontrivial case of Axiom 6 of RC Λ , which is based on the finite axiomatizability of the schemata R α .
We show, for all theories S 1 , S 2 containing EA + UTB and all β < α,
Reasoning informally inside EA + UTB, assume ϕ ∈ Π α and S 1 ∧ R β (S 2 ) ⊢ ϕ(x). Using Theorem 5.4, let ψ ∈ Π β denote a sentence equivalent to R β (S 2 ), then S 1 ⊢ ψ → ϕ(x). By R α (S 1 ) we infer ψ → ϕ(x). Since EA + UTB + R β (S 2 ) ⊢ ψ, we conclude ϕ(x). ✷ Remark 6.1 It is natural to ask if RC Λ is complete w.r.t. the considered arithmetical interpretation. We believe that for theories S containing Peano arithmetic the positive answer can be obtained by the standard methods of proving completeness of Japaridze's provability logic GLP. However, we have not worked out the details.
Conservation results for iterated reflection
In this section we prove our main conservation result, a Schmerl-type formula, related to the ordinal analysis of systems of iterated reflection principles. In the next section we will apply it to subsystems of second order arithmetic. We will follow the treatment in [9] which is quite general and deals with iterations of arbitrary computable, monotone, semi-idempotent operators. All the operators R α satisfy these conditions, so the results of Section 5 of [9] apply. We summarize what we need in the following theorem. Consider any ordinal notation system (that is, an elementary strict prewellordering) (D, ≺, 0) and any Gödelian theory U in G S .
Proposition 7.1
We can specify an elementary formula ρ(α, β, x) defining a family of Gödelian theories R β α (U ) in G S , where β ∈ D and α ∈ Λ, satisfying the following conditions provably in EA: R 0 α (U ) ≡ U and, if β ≻ 0,
Moreover, theories R β α (U ) are unique modulo provable equivalence in EA.
We will take as (D, ≺, 0) the pre-wellorderings (W α , < α , ⊤) for various α. We denote by o α (A) the (Gödel number of a) word A considered as an element of this notation system. Accordingly, R oα(A) β (S) denotes the corresponding iteration of R β applied to S.
We now consider an elementary well-ordering (Λ, <) and denote by IB <Λ , or simply IB, the theory EA + + UTB <Λ . We fix a Gödelian extension S of IB and work in G S . Let A * S denote the interpretation of a word A in G S .
Proof. We will use reflexive induction on A ∈ W α in EA + . The reflexive induction hypothesis states
We prove S + A * S ≡ α S + R oα(A) α (S) using the induction hypothesis and reasoning informally over S. We are going to use formalized versions of Theorems 5 and 6, which are available in EA and EA + , respectively. (S) by (7). Second, we prove Π 1+α -conservation. Assume π ∈ Π 1+α and S + A * S ⊢ π. We consider the following cases according to the first letter in A. 
Then, by Theorem 6, since S is Π 1+α+1 -axiomatized over UTB,
. By the reflexive induction hypothesis we obtain
Case 3. A ⊜ λB where λ > α and λ ∈ Lim. It follows that λ > α + 1 and S is axiomatized by Π <λ -sentences over UTB. By Theorem 5, over S,
S)). By the reflexive induction hypothesis
This theorem is the main result of this paper. It allows one to easily calculate proof-theoretic ordinals and conservativity spectra for many theories that can be related to progressions of iterated reflection principles of the considered kind. This is explained in more detail in the next section.
8 Proof-theoretic analysis by iterated reflection
Stating ordinal analysis results
Theorem 8 provides a way to obtain several types of results usually called proof-theoretic analyses of formal systems of predicative strength. The type of results for a given system T one is traditionally interested in include:
(i) Consistency proof for T by transfinite induction along a natural elementary well-ordering;
(ii) Characterization of the class of provably total computable functions of T ;
(iii) Characterization of the order types of elementary (or primitive recursive) well-orderings whose well-foundedness is provable in T .
It is well-known that all these questions can be reduced to the one of characterizing the set of consequences of T of an appropriate logical complexity class in terms of progressions of iterated reflection principles. More specifically, proof-theoretic analysis of a theory T by iterated reflection can be stated as a conservation result
for a suitably weak initial theory S (such as EA or IB) and appropriate ordinal notations α (such as α = 0, 1 or ω) and β. If the relation (8) holds, then T is called Π 1+α -regular and β is called its Π 1+α -ordinal (details are spelled out below). Naturally occurring theories T are, indeed, usually regular. Theorems of the form (8) appeared for the first time in the work of Ulf Schmerl [40, 41] who showed among other things that, for any n < ω and a natural ordinal notation system for ε 0 ,
The method was further developed in [2] . Here we briefly recall basic relationships with the more traditional kinds of proof-theoretic analyses associated with logical complexity levels Π 0 1 , Π 0 2 and Π 1 1 . Consistency proofs, as in (i), can be obtained from a characterization of arithmetical Π 0 1 -consequences of T in terms of iterated consistency assertions. For example, if T ≡ 0 R α 0 (EA) holds provably in EA + and α is a limit ordinal, then EA + ⊢ Con(T ) ↔ ∀β < α R β 0 (EA). Since EA + proves RFN Σ 1 (EA), we have
Hence, transfinite induction up to α over EA + is sufficient to derive ∀β < α R β 0 (EA) and Con(T ). In fact, this argument only requires the use of transfinite induction rule for a specific Π 1 (or even a ∆ 0 ) formula.
A characterization of the class F(T ) of provably total computable functions of T in terms of the fast growing hierarchy of functions, as in (ii), follows from a characterization of Π 0 2 -consequences of T in terms of iterated uniform Π 0 2 -reflection principles over EA. These claims are elaborated in [2] , here we state a quick summary.
With an elementary well-ordering (Ω, <) (canonical or not) one can associate a hierarchy of fast-growing functions F α : N → N for all α < Ω:
We define F α as the elementary closure of {F β : β ≺ α}. These classes are the same as the standard fast growing hierarchy classes for systems of ordinal notation with a reasonable fundamental sequences assignment (see [39] ), however they are defined even when the latter are not available. Then the following theorem holds [2] :
Notice that Claim (ii) follows from (i).
Now we turn to the characterization of the supremum of order types of T -provably well-founded elementary well-orderings, as in (iii), aka the prooftheoretic Π 1 1 -ordinal of T . A recent paper by Pakhomov and Walsh [36] provides a general result characterizing this ordinal in terms of progressions of iterated Π 1 1 -reflection principles in the language of second order arithmetic. Equivalently, it can be stated in terms of iterated full uniform reflection principles in the language of first order arithmetic enriched by a free predicate letter X.
The present setup specifically allows for the extension of the language of the initial theory by a free predicate letter. Hence, in this context Π 1 1 -analysis amounts to Π X <ω -analysis of a formal system in the language with X. The following proposition is a consequence of Theorem 5.9 and Lemma 4.15 of [36] .
As before, Claim (ii) directly follows from Claim (i). Summing up our short discussion ordinal analysis we see that it is advantageous to state ordinal analysis results in the form (8) , for these conservativity relationships yield all the main types of results found in the literature and sometimes, especially in complexity Π 0 1 , provide sharper characterizations. It is a different matter how one can obtain results such as (8) .
Conservation results can be obtained by a variety of proof-and modeltheoretic methods. However, technical details can sometimes become simpler if one uses methods adapted to deal with reflection principles. The role of reflection algebras is just that, as explained in the next subsection.
The use of reflection algebras for proof-theoretic analysis
Proof-theoretic analyses such as (i)-(iii) above can be obtained by the following two steps:
1. For a given theory T we either find an axiomatization by a finite combination of reflection principles A * S over a chosen basic system S (such as EA or EA + + UTB in our case) or reduce T to a theory U of this form (that is, prove an apropriate partial conservation result between T and U ).
Reduce A *
S to a transfinite iteration of reflection principles of a particular complexity class, such as Π 1 , Π 2 , or Π X <ω . In our case this is achieved by Theorem 8 and this ordinal will be equal to o α (A), for some α, typically α = 0, 1 or ω, and some A ∈ W α .
We remark that Step 1 above is, in practice, relatively easy, since for natural theories T suitable reflection principles are often well-known. The main difficulty in applying these methods is in Step 2, which depends on the overall structure of reflection principles of various complexity levels not to contain big 'gaps'. Theorem 8 is based on the two main conservation results (Theorems 5 and 6) that can be seen as stating that there are no such gaps.
This idea was first applied to Peano arithmetic and its fragments where Japaridze's polymodal provability logic GLP was used instead of the reflection calculus RC [3, 4] . It was later remarked that for these kind of applications the strictly positive fragment of GLP axiomatized by RC is sufficient and allows for a simpler treatment [6] .
A case study: Analysis of ACA
This method of analysis, in the simplest situation going beyond Peano arithmetic, can be illustrated by the well-known example of the second order theory ACA. This system extends PA by the schemata of induction, for all second order formulas, and by the comprehension schema:
for each arithmetical formula ϕ (possibly with first-and second-order parameters but not containing Y as a parameter).
It is well-known that ACA is ω-mutually-interpretable with the extension of EA in the language L(T) by the full induction schema together with the compositional axioms for truth (see e.g. [25] ). We denote the latter theory PA(T) := EA + CT + IL(T). One way, the interpretation works by defining the domain of set variables by an elementary formula Set(e) expressing "e is the Gödel number of an arithmetical formula with one free variable", and by letting
x ∈ e def ⇐⇒ Set(e) ∧ T(e(x)).
The other way, the interpretation works by defining in ACA a ∆ 1 1 truth predicate for arithmetical formulas (see, e.g., [44] or Appendix B of this paper).
By Lemma 2.4, full induction in L(T) follows from full reflection. Vice versa, the standard argument based on cut-elimination shows that full induction in the presence of CT proves full reflection. Let S := EA + + UTB L(T) . We have already noted that the compositional axioms are provable from Σ 1 (T)-RFN(S) over S. Thus,
PA(T) ≡ S + L(T)-RFN(S).
The latter theory is the same as
Hence, we can apply Theorem 8 to S + R ω2 (S). Note that o ω ((ω2)⊤) = o(ω⊤) = ε 0 . Therefore, Theorem 8 yields that PA(T) is conservative over S + R ε 0 ω (S) for Π ω -sentences. The latter theory is conservative over ε 0 times iterated arithmetical uniform reflection over EA + (or equivalently over PA). This gives a characterization of arithmetical consequences of PA(T) and of ACA. The same reasoning, when carried out in the language with a free predicate letter X, yields the well-known bound ε ε 0 on the provably wellfounded elementary orderings in ACA, by [36] .
We also obtain that o n ((ω2)⊤) = o((ω2)⊤)) = ϕ 1 (ϕ 1 (0)) = ε ε 0 , for all n < ω. Hence, by Theorem 8 PA(T) is a Π n+1 -conservative extension of EA + + R εε 0 n (EA + ), for each n < ω. This shows, in particular, that Π 0 1 -consequences of ACA are axiomatized by ε ε 0 times iterated consistency over EA + . Similarly, the class of provably total computable functions of ACA is the ε ε 0 -th class of the extended Grzegorczyk hierarchy.
Similarly, one can analyze subtheories of PA(T) defined by restricted induction. These theories have been studied by Kotlarski and Ratajczyk [31] who obtained a characterization of their arithmetical consequences in terms of iterated arithmetical uniform reflection principles.
By relativization of the usual proof in arithmetic we have that EA + CT + IΣ n (T) is equivalent to S + Π n+2 (T)-RFN(S). Note that we need CT to infer reflection from induction, but Σ 1 (T)-reflection over UTB already implies CT. Therefore,
We have o ω ((ω + n + 1)⊤) = o((n + 1)⊤) = ω n+1 , where ω 0 = 1, and ω n+1 = ω ωn . Hence, EA + IΣ n (T) is conservative over ω n+1 -fold iteration of arithmetical uniform reflection over EA. Now we can remark that, under the standard interpretation of the second order language in L(T), arithmetical formulas with set parameters are translated into ∆ 0 (T)-formulas, and hence Σ 1 n -formulas are translated to Σ n (T)-formulas. Hence, EA + CT + IΣ n (T) interprets ACA 0 + IΣ 1 n . Therefore, its Π <ω -ordinal is bounded by ω n+1 , and
Applications to theories of iterated arithmetical comprehension will be more comprehensively presented in Section 9.
Conservativity spectra
The notions of Π 0 1+n -ordinal [2] and conservativity spectrum [28, 8] can be naturally generalized to the classes of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy.
Let us fix, as before, an elementary well-ordering Λ and the corresponding language L Λ . By IB α we denote the extension of EA + by the axioms UTB α , and IB <α denotes the union of theories IB β for all β < α. We will consider iterations of reflection principles along another elementary wellordering that need not be related to Λ. Let us fix such a well-ordering Ω.
Definition 2 Let S be a Gödelian extension of IB.
• (lower) Π 1+α -ordinal of S, denoted ord α (S), is the supremum of all β ∈ Ω such that S ⊢ R β α (IB);
• S is Π 1+α -regular if lower and upper Π 1+α -ordinals of S coincide, that is, ord α (S) = ord u α (S).
As for finite α, Π 1+α -ordinals are insensitive to Π 1+α -conservative extensions and to extensions by consistent Σ 1+α -axioms.
Proposition 8.3
For for all α < ω(1 + Λ),
(ii) Suppose S is Π 1+α -regular. If T is axiomatized by Σ 1+α -sentences and S ∪ T is consistent, then ord α (S ∪ T ) = ord α (S).
Proof. The first claim follows from the fact that R β α (IB) is a Π 1+α -axiomatized extension of IB. The second claim follows from the well-known result that R α (U ) is not contained in any consistent Σ 1+α -axiomatized extension of U . ✷
The sequence of Π 1+n -ordinals of a given system S is sometimes called its conservativity spectrum. This sequence bears the more detailed information about the strength of a given theory at various levels of logical complexity than any individual proof-theoretic ordinal. Joost Joosten [28] studied such sequences for finite n. He showed for theories between EA + and PA that their conservativity spectra correspond to decreasing sequences of ordinals below ε 0 of a certain kind, that is, to the points of the so-called Ignatiev frame. Beklemishev [9] showed that the set of spectra naturally bears the structure of an RC-algebra with conservativity operators. An immediate generalization of conservativity spectra in arithmetic is as follows.
Definition 3 Conservativity spectrum of S is the sequence (α ξ ) ξ<ω(1+Λ) such that α ξ = ord ξ (S), for all ξ.
More explicitly, we can call it the ω(1 + Λ)-conservativity spectrum of S.
As an example consider the theory ACA or PA(T). Since PA(T) is formulated in L ω2 , we consider its ω2-spectrum. As we have seen, this is the sequence (ε ε 0 , ε ε 0 , . . . ; ε 0 , ε 0 , . . . ).
Observe that if, for example, instead of PA(T) we consider the set of its arithmetical consequences (axiomatized by ε 0 -fold iteration of arithmetical uniform reflection principle), then its conservativity spectrum looks as follows: (ε ε 0 , ε ε 0 , . . . ; 0, 0, . . . ).
We conjecture that in general conservativity spectra consist precisely of ℓ-sequences in the sense of [21] . Therefore, they one-to-one correspond the points of the generalized Ignatiev frames constructed by Fernández and Joosten. However, proving this conjecture remains out of the scope of the present paper.
Analysis of second order systems
In this section we show how Theorem 8 can be used to obtain ordinal analysis of some systems of second order arithmetic of 'predicative' strength.
Ordinal analysis of iterated arithmetical comprehension
For the purposes of this section we use as the ordinal notion system Λ any natural elementary ordinal notation system that contains the symbol for 0, is closed under addition, function ω x , and the binary Veblen function ϕ x (y). We also assume that EA + is capable to prove standard universal properties of this functions in the ordinal notation system, e.g., that addition is associative, that ω α < ω β iff α < β, that ϕ α (ϕ β (γ)) = ϕ β (γ), for β > α, etc. Note that it is well-known to be the case for the standard ordinal notation systems for the ordinal Γ 0 .
The base theory of second-order arithmetic we consider is the well-known theory ACA 0 , that is, the extension of EA by the scheme of arithmetic comprehension (9) and the axiom of set-induction
Due to our choice of base theory, we freely use pseudo-terms {x | F (x)}, when F (x) is a Π 0 ∞ -formula. The are various ways how one could axiomatized the theory of iterated Π 0 1 -comprehension (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) α . Officially we will use the axiomatization that extends ACA 0 by the following scheme:
here (Y ) β := {x : β, x ∈ Y } and (Y ) <β := {x : ∃γ < β γ, x ∈ Y }. However, in certain situations it will be useful for us to use a different axiomatization that extends ACA 0 by the axiom stating that for any set X the α-th Turing jump X (α) exists. We also consider the following theories
Note that some usual systems are of this form:
Recall that the definitions of the theories UTB <α and UTB ≤α required to first fix the ground language L (that should be an extension of arithmetical language by finitely many predicate symbols). In this section it will be sufficient to only consider the case of L expanding the arithmetical language by only one unary predicate symbol X(x). The inclusion of the free predicate symbol is important for studying the Π 1 1 -consequences of second-order theories. We identify the unary predicate letter X(x) with the set variable X and the atomic formulas X(t) with the atomic formulas t ∈ X. This allows us to identify a Π 1 1 -sentence ∀Y ϕ(Y ) with the L-sentence ϕ(X) and to talk about the sets of Π 1 1 -consequences of theories whose language contains L. We define a translation E X (·) of the language L Λ into the language of second-order arithmetic. The set variable X is the only parameter of the translation. The translation E X (·) interprets symbols of arithmetical language by themselves and the predicate X by the set X.
To define the interpretations E X (T α (x)) of truth predicates we will use partial truth predicates encoded by sets. A set P of Gödel numbers of L α sentences is called a compositional truth definiton for L α over a set X if the following conditions hold:
1. ϕ ∈ P ↔ ϕ, for any atomic arithmetic sentence ϕ; 2. X(t) ∈ P ↔ v(t) ∈ X, for for any closed term t;
In this case we write TP X α (P ). We finish the definition of E X by interpreting the predicates T α (x) as
By this translation we will consider L Λ to be a sub-language of the language of second-order arithmetic and will freely use expressions like S ≡ α U , where S is a second-order theory and U is an L Λ theory (or vice versa). In terms of the translation E X (·) this means that for each Π 1+α sentence ϕ we have S ⊢ ∀X E X (ϕ) ⇐⇒ U ⊢ ϕ. Now let us state our two central results connecting systems of secondorder arithmetic with the systems of iterated truth definitions.
Before proving these two theorems we will elaborate on how the prooftheoretic analysis for theories of iterated Π 0 1 -comprehension follows from the two results and the discussion in Section 8.1. 
Combining the observations above with Theorem 8 and computations from Section 6.2 we get the following Schmerl-style formulas for the theories of iterated Π 0 1 -comprehension:
Theorem 11 For α 1,
, for limit λ and β < ω λ .
Proof. Let us first prove Claim 1. By Theorem 9 and Theorem 8 we have
To finish the proof of Claim 1 we calculate
where we use results of Section 6.2 and the fact that ω α+1 = β + ω α+1 . For Claims 2 and 3 by Theorem 10 and Theorem 8 we have
To prove Claim 2 we observe ω α+1 + ω = β + ω α+1 + ω whence
To prove Claim 3 we notice ω α+1 + ω = β + ω and thus o β (ω α+1 + ω) = o(ω) = ε 0 . Let us prove Claim 4. Since ω λ = sup{δω | δ < ω λ } = sup{δω + ω | δ < ω λ }, by (11) and (12) we obtain 2. Theory EA + plus transfinite induction for ∆ 0 -formulas up to ϕ α+1 (ε 0 ) proves the consistency of (Π 0 1 -CA) ω α .
3. For limit λ the theory EA + plus transfinite induction for ∆ 0 -formulas up to ϕ λ (0) proves the consistency of (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) <ω λ and (Π 0 1 -CA) <ω λ .
Corollary 9.2 For α 1,
Corollary 9.3 For α 1,
3. For limit λ, the Π 1 1 -ordinal of (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) <ω λ and (Π 0 1 -CA) <ω λ is ϕ λ (0).
Remark 9.4
In this section we have not covered the theories ACA 0 = (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) 1 and ACA = (Π 0 1 -CA) 1 . This is due to the fact that we wanted to simplify our proofs and the cases of ACA 0 and ACA require a separate consideration (we already considered the case of ACA in Section 8.3). The main reason for this complication is that the theories of iterated truth definitions treat successor stages of hyperarthmetical hierarchy Π α+1 and limit stages Π λ differently.
Constructing a universe of sets from truth definitions
In this and next section we prove Theorems 9 and 10. The result of this section are the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9.5 For any α,
Lemma 9.6 For any α,
Note that Lemmas 9.5 and 9.6 essentially are the parts of Theorems 9 and 10 that are sufficient to prove the upper bounds for Π 1 1 , Π 0 2 , and Π 0 1 ordinals of (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) ω α and (Π 0 1 -CA) ω α . As we will see, there is an essential difference between the conservation results of Lemma 9.5 and 9.6. We prove Lemma 9.5 by a modeltheoretic construction. Given a model M R <ω 1+α+1 (IB) we construct a model DEF ω α+1 (M) (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) ω α , where M and DEF ω α+1 (M) have the same first-order arithmetical part. This does not lead to an interpretation of
. Moreover, such an interpretation is impossible, since (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) ω α is finitely axiomatizable and at the same time proves the consistency of any finite subtheory of R <ω 1+α+1 (IB). On the other hand, we prove Lemma 9.6 by constructing an ω-interpretation D ω α+1 of (Π 0 1 -CA) ω α in R <ω 1+α+1 +ω (IB). This ω-interpretation is provided by a formalized version of the proof of Lemma 9.5.
For a model M of UTB <α we define a model of second-order arithmetic DEF α (M). The arithmetical part of DEF α (M) coincides with the arithmetical part of M. The second-order part of DEF α (M) consists of all the subsets of M definable by L α -formulas with parameters from M.
Proof of Lemma 9.5. It is enough to show that for any M R <ω 1+α+1 (IB) the model DEF ω α+1 (M) satisfies (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) ω 1+α . For an L ω α+1 -formula ϕ(x) with parameters from M we denote by D ϕ the set {a | M ϕ(a)}. Clearly, each set A from DEF ω α+1 (M) is D ϕ for some ϕ. Naturally, we can treat Π 0 ∞ formulas ψ( x) with parameters from DEF ω α+1 (M) as L ω α+1 formulas: We transform ψ to an L ω α+1 -formula by replacing the subformulas t ∈ D ϕ with ϕ(t). Moreover, we apply the same treatment to arbitrary L Λ -formulas and use the formulas t ∈ D ϕ as shorthands for ϕ(t). Since we talk about definable hierarchies, in addition we will use formulas t ∈ (D ϕ ) β as shorthands for ϕ( t, β ) and formulas t ∈ (D ϕ ) <β as shorthands for ϕ(t) ∧ ∃γ < β∃x (t = γ, x ).
Since R <ω 1+α+1 (IB) proves induction for L α formulas, we see that the model DEF ω α+1 (M) satisfies the second-order induction axiom. Clearly, the result of comprehension for a Π 0 ∞ formula ϕ(x) with parameters from
To finish the proof of DEF ω α+1 (M) (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) ω 1+α we need to show that for any Π 0 ∞ formula A(x, Y ) whose parameters are from DEF ω α+1 (M) there is a set H ∈ DEF ω α+1 (M) such that
Let us fix some δ < ω α+1 such that all the set parameters of A are sets defined by formulas from L δ . By (a formalized version of) recursion theorem we define Kalmar elementary sequence ϕ β (x) | β ≤ ω 1+α of Gödel numbers of L ω α+1 -formulas within M:
The set H that we want to construct is encoded by the formula ϕ ω 1+α (x). Since the latter is given by a possibly non-standard Gödel number in M, in order to use it we put it inside an apropriate truth definition. Let γ = δ + ω α + 1 and let ψ(x) be the formula T γ (ϕ ω 1+α (x)). Now we just need to show that the set D ψ satisfies the required conditions on H, i.e., that
Since M is a model of R <ω 1+α+1 (IB) and ωγ + ω < ω 1+α+1 , the model M satisfies R <ωγ+ω (R <ωγ+ω (IB)). Hence, in order to prove (14) it is enough to show that within M, for all (possibly non-standard) β < ω α and all k, there is an R <γ+ω (IB) proof of the equivalence
Further, we work within M. First, notice that R <γ+ω (IB) proves
Let us construct an R <γ+ω (IB) proof of the equivalence
We achieve this by subsequently proving in R <γ+ω (IB) the equivalence between the following formulas:
and of
Therefore, R <γ+ω (IB) proves (15):
which concludes the proof of the lemma.✷
Proof of Lemma 9.6. We define an ω-interpretation D ω α+1 of (Π 0 1 -CA) ω 1+α in R <ω 1+α+1 +ω (IB). In the interpretation D ω α+1 , sets are interpreted by Gödel numbers of L ω α+1 -formulas ϕ(x) without other free variables. The interpretation x ∈ * ϕ of the membership predicate is defined by the formula T ω α+1 (ϕ(x)). In other words, the Gödel number of ϕ(x) represents the set
D ω α+1 is a version of the model DEF ω α+1 (N) formally constructed within R <ω 1+α+1 +ω (IB). Since in R <ω 1+α+1 +ω (IB) we can prove the induction for all L ω α+1 formulas, as well as a number of natural properties of T ω α+1 , we can formalize the proof of Lemma 9.5 taking D ω α+1 as M. Thus, we see that D ω α+1 is an ω-interpretation of (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) ω 1+α . Since the interpretation of any second order formula is a formula of L ω α+1 +1 , the full scheme of induction holds under this interpretation. ✷
Interpreting iterated reflection principles in iterated comprehension theories
In this section we finish the proofs of Theorem 9 and Theorem 10. The key technical observation we need is Lemma 9.7 that will allow us to reason about the translations E X within the theories of iterated Π 0 1 -comprehension. Recall that there is an axiomatization of each (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) α over ACA 0 by a single sentence asserting that for each X there exists the α-th Turing jump X (α) . In this assertion we could replace α with a variable x to obtain a formula (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) x . This allows us to formulate Lemma 9.7.
Lemma 9.7 ACA 0 proves that
Before proving Lemma 9.7 we need to 'bootstrap' theory (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) α . Often, in the past works on the theories of iterated comprehension, in addition to the comprehension principles the well-orderness of α was included as one of the axioms. However, recently D. Flumini and K. Sato [23] observed that the axiom of iterated Π 0 1 -comprehension along an order α implies the well-foundedness of α. We will use a version of their result.
Proof. Reasoning in ACA 0 , we consider some α < Λ and under the assumption (Π 0 1 -CA) α claim that α is a well-ordering. Let us consider any set X of ordinals < α and show that X is either empty or has the least element.
We claim that there exists Y ⊆ X such that for
Indeed, we use (Π 0 1 -CA) α to construct Z such that, for β < α,
Notice that by (16) any element of Y is its least element, hence Y consists of at most one element. If Y is empty then by (16)
and we are done. If Y = {β} then β is the least element of X, since (16) guarantees that Y contains any element of X that is smaller than β.✷ Remark 9.9 The construction of Y in the proof of Lemma 9.8 essentially is a variant of Yablo-Visser paradox [47, 45] . An interesting feature of the proof is that it did not require the use of any kind of fixed points. This contrasts with Visser's construction [45] , where he used the Diagonal Lemma to show that the paradox is applicable to descending sequences of truth predicates.
Proof of Lemma 9.7. We reason in ACA 0 . Our goal is to prove
We consider some α < Λ and a set X. We assume (Π 0 1 -CA) ω(α+1) and claim that there exists a unique P such that TP X α (P ). Within this proof it will be useful to consider classes of sentences C β,n ⊆ L β consisting of all L β -sentences of logic depth n . Observe that L α = β≤α,n∈ω C β,n .
Let us first prove that, for any two P, P ′ , if TP X α (P ) and TP X α (P ′ ) then P = P ′ . For this it is enough to show that ∀β < α∀n (P ∩ C β,n = P ′ ∩ C β,n ). We prove the latter by a straightforward transfinite induction on the values of ωβ + n. To justify the steps of induction we use the compositionality of both P and P ′ . We could use this kind of argument, since by Lemma 9.8 we have WO(ω(α + 1)). Now let us construct some P that is a compositional truth definition for L α over X. Using iterated comprehension we define a set E such that for all β ≤ α and n ∈ ω:
Moreover, for each β ′ occurring in ϕ (such a T β ′ is necessarily less than β), we have
Hence, by the compositionality of P β we easily verify (17) . Due to the compositionality of P β it is easy to check that any logical or non-logical axiom of the L β -theory EA + UTB <β is an element of P β . Thus, given a proof p of an L β sentence in EA + UTB <β , by a straightforward induction on formulas in p we verify that the conclusion of p is an element of P β . Since P β coincides with the E X -interpretation of T β , we infer that the E X -translation of T β -RFN(EA + UTB <β ) holds.✷ Lemma 9.11 For all α 0,
Proof. In Lemma 9.5 we proved that for any model M of R <ω 1+α+1 (IB), the model
To prove the present lemma we need to verify that for each β < ω α+1 the E D X -interpretation of T β within DEF ω α+1 (M) coincides with T β within M. Indeed, this will imply that if M ϕ, for some
Since the construction works for all M R <ω 1+α+1 (IB), we will infer the conclusion of the lemma.
Within DEF ω α+1 (M) the set D T β clearly is a compositional truth predicate for L β over D X . Since DEF ω α+1 (M) is a model of (Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) ω(β+1) , by Lemma 9.7 the set D T β is the only compositional truth predicate for L β over D X . Thus, T β within M coincide with the E D X -interpretation of T β within DEF ω α+1 (M). ✷ This concludes the proof of Theorem 9. Now let us prove Theorem 10. We will use the same scheme as in the case of Theorem 9. First, we prove Lemma 9.12 that provides an embedding of a theory of iterated truth predicates into a theory of iterated comprehension. Second, in Lemma 9.13 we show that the construction of Lemma 9.6 yields conservation not only for L 0 , but for L ω α+1 . Lemma 9.12 For all α 0,
Proof. It is sufficient to verify in (Π 0 1 -CA) ω 1+α that the following schemes hold under the E X -translation, for any X:
By a straightforward induction we prove ∀n ((Π 0 1 -CA 0 ) ω 1+α n ) in the theory (Π 0 1 -CA) ω 1+α . Hence, by Lemma 9.7, the theory (Π 0 1 -CA) ω 1+α proves that, for all β < ω α+1 and all sets X, there exists a unique set P X β such that TP X β (P X β ). Using provable uniqueness of P X β , for any particular instance of UTB β (for some β ≤ ω α+1 ) we easily prove its E X -translation in (Π 0 1 -CA) ω 1+α . Note that there is a difference between the cases of β < ω α+1 and β = ω α+1 . In the latter case we do not have access to a set that is a compositional truth definition for L ω α+1 . The E X -interpretation of T ω α+1 essentially is the union β<ω α+1 P X β (which is not necessarily a set). Let us consider an instance of L ω α+1 +1 -RFN(IB)
where ϕ is a Π L ω α+1 +1 n -formula. Reasoning in (Π 0 1 -CA) ω 1+α , we consider a set X and claim that the E X -translation of (18) holds. We assume that for some x we have ✷ IB ϕ( x) and prove ϕ( x).
By a formalized version of Lemma 5.2 we obtain ✷ EA+UTB ≤ω α+1 ϕ( x).
Recall that the theory EA + UTB ≤ω α+1 is Π L ω α+1 +1 2 -axiomatizable. Hence, by a standard application of the cut-elimination theorem we get a EA + UTB ≤ω α+1 -proof p of ϕ( x), where all the formulas are from Π L ω α+1 +1 n+2
. In order to finish the proof we construct a compositional partial truth definition Tr n+2 (y) for Π L ω α+1 +1 n+2 -sentences such that Tr n+2 (ϕ( x)) ↔ E X (ϕ( x)) and the axioms from Π L ω α+1 +1 2 -axiomatization of EA + UTB ≤ω α+1 are true in Tr n+2 . Given such a definition, by a straightforward induction on the structure of p we show that the universal closures of all of them are true, hence ϕ( x) holds.
To define Tr n+2 , we evaluate atomic arithmetical sentences by their standard truth value, we evaluate X(x) by the set X, for β < ω α+1 we evaluate predicates T β as P X β , and we evaluate T ω α+1 as β<ω α+1 P X β . Next, in a standard manner, we expand Tr n+2 to all Π L ω α+1 +1 n+2 -formulas (in Appendix A we construct a partial truth definition for finite languages L, essentially the same construction works in the case that we are interested in here). Finally, using the compositionality of P X β , we verify that all the required axioms are true in Tr n+2 .✷ Lemma 9.13 For all α 0, (Π 0 1 -CA) ω 1+α ⊆ ω 1+α+1 +ω R <ω 1+α+1 +ω (IB).
Proof. Let us work in R <ω 1+α+1 +ω (IB). In Lemma 9.6 we constructed an ω-interpretation D ω α+1 of (Π 0 1 -CA) ω 1+α+1 in R <ω 1+α+1 +ω (IB). Let D X be the set {x | T ω α+1 (X(x))} within D ω α+1 . To prove the claim we just verify, for any externally given β ≤ ω α+1 , that
Or in other words, we show that the predicate T β coincide with D ω α+1 -interpretation of the E D X -interpretation of T β .
Observe that for β < ω α+1 the set D T β = {x | T ω α+1 (T β (x))} in D ω α+1 is a compositional truth definition for L β over D X . Hence using the fact that within D ω α+1 , for any γ < ω α+1 , there exists a unique compositional truth definition for L β over D X , we easily obtain the equivalence (19) in the case β < ω α+1 .
To show (19) for the case β = ω α+1 , we prove that, for all γ < ω α+1 ,
Within the D ω α+1 -interpretation, the set D Tγ is the only compositional partial truth definition for L γ over X. Hence,
and therefore
Using L γ+1 -reflection we easily prove that for any ϕ ∈ L γ , we have T ω α+1 (ϕ) ↔ T ω α+1 (T γ (ϕ)). Thus, we derive (20) from (21) .✷ This concludes the proof of Theorem 10.
A Truth definitions for
We consider a signature L extending that of arithmetic by finitely many predicate letters. We assume that our language is that of Tait calculus, that is, formulas are obtained from atomic ones and their negations by ∧, ∨, ∀ , ∃ . Our goal is to show the existence of suitable truth definitions for ∆ L 0 -formulas. For this class we consider the following positive Tarski conditions for Tr: (P1) ∀ x (ϕ( x) → Tr(ϕ( x))), if ϕ is a literal; (P2) ∀ϕ, ψ (Tr(ϕ) ∧ Tr(ψ) → Tr(ϕ ∧ ψ)); (P3) ∀ϕ, ψ ((Tr(ϕ) ∨ Tr(ψ)) → Tr(ϕ ∨ ψ)); (P4) ∀ϕ, t, n (v(t) = n ∧ ∀x n Tr(ϕ(x)) → Tr(∀x t ϕ(x))); (P5) ∀ϕ, t, n (v(t) = n ∧ ∃x n Tr(ϕ(x)) → Tr(∃x t ϕ(x))).
Here ϕ ranges over Gödel numbers of ∆ L 0 -sentences (or formulas with the shown free variables), and t ranges over Gödel numbers of variable-free terms. We assume fixed a provably total evaluation function v(t) for the variable-free terms for the standard language of arithmetic with 0, S, + and × in EA.
Theorem 12
There is a Π L 1 -formula Tr such that (i) Positive Tarski conditions are provable in EA;
(ii) Converse implications in Tarski conditions are provable in EA L .
Proof. To construct Tr we first introduce a special two-place ∆ L 0 -formula denoted s | θ, where s is understood as a code of a finite function and θ as a Gödel number of a ∆ L 0 -sentence. Informally, s | θ says that s is an assignment of {0, 1} to numerical instances of subformulas of θ sufficient to compute its truth value and that this truth assignment is locally correct w.r.t. truth conditions for atomic formulas, logical connectives and bounded quantifiers. Somewhat more formally, s | θ can be stated as a conjunction of the following clauses:
Assume ∀x n Tr(ϕ(x)) ∧ v(t) = n. We need to prove Tr(∀x t ϕ(x)) that is ∀s (s | ∀x t ϕ(x) → s(∀x t ϕ(x)) = 1).
So, assume s | ∀x t ϕ(x), then (∀x t ϕ(x)) ∈ dom(s), whence by clause 5 ∀m n(ϕ(m) ∈ dom(s)). For each m n we have Tr(ϕ(m)) by assumption and s | ϕ(m), since ϕ(m) ∈ dom(s). Therefore, ∀m n s(ϕ(m)) = 1 and thus s(∀x t ϕ(x)) = 1, as required. Similar arguments establish the rest of P1-P5, which concludes our sketch of Part (i).
The proof of the next lemma is straightforward by induction on the build-up of ϕ and we omit it.
Lemma A. 1 The following claims are provable in EA L :
(i) ∀s 1 , s 2 , ϕ (s 1 | ϕ ∧ s 2 | ϕ → s 1 (ϕ) = s 2 (ϕ));
(ii) ∀ϕ ∃s s | ϕ.
Notice that the existential quantifier on s in Claim (ii) can be bounded by an elementary function of ϕ which allows us to apply ∆ L 0 -induction for its proof.
In order to demonstrate Part (ii) of the theorem let us again consider the converse to P4. We are to demonstrate ∀m n Tr(ϕ(m)) assuming Tr(∀x t ϕ(x)) and v(t) = n. So, consider any m n and s such that s | ϕ(m). Using Lemma A.1 (ii) let s ′ be such that s ′ | ∀x t ϕ(x)). Then ϕ(m) ∈ dom(s ′ ) and s ′ (ϕ(m)) = 1 by item 5. of the definition of |. Then, by Lemma A.1 (i) we conclude s(ϕ(m)) = s ′ (ϕ(m)) = 1.
The remaining converses to P1-P5 are treated similarly. ✷ Corollary A.2 For each ∆ L 0 -formula ϕ( x),
(ii) EA L ⊢ ∀ x (Tr(ϕ( x)) → ϕ( x)).
Proof. This is proved by external induction on the build-up of ϕ using P1-P5 and their converses. ✷
The classes Π L n and Σ L n are defined from ∆ L 0 as usual:
: ϕ ∈ Σ L n }, and Σ L n+1 = {∃ x ϕ( x) : ϕ ∈ Π L n }. The corresponding truth predicates can be inductively defined as follows:
• Tr(x) serves as a truth definition for Σ L 0 ;
• Tr Π L n+1 (ϕ) := ∀ψ ∈ Σ L n (ϕ ⊜ ∀ x ψ( x) → ∀z Tr Σ L n (ψ((z) 0 , . . . , (z) k−1 )));
(¬ϕ).
In the last item, ¬ϕ is obtained by de Morgan rules from ϕ, therefore ϕ ∈ Σ L m iff ¬ϕ ∈ Π L m . Then we readily obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 13 Let Γ be either Π L n or Σ L n , n 1. For each ϕ( x) ∈ Γ, (i) EA L ⊢ ∀ x (ϕ( x) ↔ Tr Γ (ϕ( x)));
, for some k 1.
We are actually using Statement (i) and Statememnt (ii) for Γ = Π L 1 .
